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JURISDICTION
Respondents Dale Gurley and the Division of Peace Officer
Standards and Training ("POST"), the Department of Public Safety
and the State of Utah (hereafter "Respondents") disagree with the
statement

of

jurisdiction

contained

in

petitioner's

brief.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(a), authorizing appeals from "final
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992 Supp.)

(emphasis added). There was no final order reviewable by the Court
of Appeals because there was no formal adjudicative proceeding at
the agency level.

There could be no adjudicative proceeding,

because none is authorized by law for these circumstances.

No

hearing being authorized, no proceeding having commenced, no final
order having issued, no appeal should be presented to this Court.
Petitioner also claims this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah Code Ann.
sections 63-46b-12 and -14, and Utah Administrative Code R728-40923.

Rule 14 does not grant jurisdiction, it merely provides the

procedure by which review is to be had "[w]hen judicial review by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of
[sic] an order or decision of an administrative agency, board,
commission, committee, or officer . • . •" Utah R. App. P. 14 (a).
Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah Code merely states the procedure,
again, by which review is to be had, as indicated by the section's

title "Agency review—Procedure."

Section 63-46b-14 of the Utah

Code and R728-409-23 of the Administrative Code base jurisdiction
on the existence of an agency final order, which was never issued
under these facts because, again, no adjudicative proceeding ever
commenced, nor was one ever authorized.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether an adjudicative proceeding by the Division of

POST must be commenced upon receipt of a citizen's complaint
against a police officer.
2.

Whether

a

final

order

from

a

formal

adjudicative

proceeding was issued by the Division of POST.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
When the only issues before the Court are issues of law, the
standard of appellate review is correction of error.

See Utah

Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Coirm'n, 658 P. 2d 601, 608
(Utah

1983).

When

the

issue before

the Court

is

its own

jurisdiction it reviews the applicable statutes afresh.

See

Scientific Academy of Hair Design, Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P. 2d 242,
243-44 (Ct. App. 1987).

Because there was no summary judgment or

dismissal, those standards cited by petitioner are irrelevant.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a):
Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons
other than the agency to initiate adjudicative
2

proceedings, that person's request for agency action
shall be in writing . . . .
Administrative Rule 728-409-3:
The division may initiate an investigation when it
receives an allegation that grounds for refusal,
suspension, or revocation of certification exist. The
initial allegation may come from any responsible source,
including, but not limited to those provisions of R728409-5.
(Empha sis added.)
Administrative Rule 728-409-5(B)(6):
The initiation of an investigation may occur upon any of
the following circumstances:
(6) A complaint from a citizen which, on its face,
appears to be a violation of section 409-3 above.
(Empha sis added.)
Administrative Rule 728-409-5(M):
Final disposition of a case (i.e., close case, refer to
department for follow-up action, refer for adjudicative
proceeding, etc.) will be made by the bureau chief with
the approval of the director.
Administrative Rule 728-409-8(A):
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20 and
Rule R728-409-25, all adjudicative proceedings shall be
commenced by notice of an Administrative Complaint
accompanied by a Notice of Agency Action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case mistakenly appears before the Court as a result of
petitioner's misconstruction of the rules of the Division of POST
and of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). POST is an
agency created to ensure that police officers are qualified,
trained, and that certain standards of performance are maintained.
3

A.

Nature of the Proceedings Below.
Petitioner wrote Post as authorized by Administrative Rule

728-409-5(B)(6) on September 3, 1991, complaining about certain
actions

of

police

officer

Dale

Gurley.

After

thoroughly

investigating the complaint and determining not to refer the case
for adjudicative proceedings, the bureau chief and agency director,
pursuant to Administrative Rule 728-409-5(M), issued a letter to
petitioner on May 6, 1992, indicating the decision not to refer the
case for an adjudicative proceeding. That should have been the end
of

the matter.

Petitioner, however, exhibiting

a

lack of

understanding of both the rules he cites and of UAPA, filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration" at the agency level, and ultimately,
this appeal on June 4, 1992.

Respondents subsequently filed a

motion for summary disposition on July 2, 1992, which this Court
denied on October 13, 1992.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The facts presented in petitioner's brief are irrelevant to
this appeal because the only issues properly before the Court are
issues of law. However, because petitioner's statement of facts is
riddled with mischaracterizations, respondents are constrained to
respond briefly.
There are no uncontroverted facts as petitioner asserts.
Petitioner refers to his "Verified Complaint," the complaint he
made to POST regarding the actions of Officer Gurley, the facts
contained within which he claims to be "uncontroverted" because,
presumably, respondents filed no answer.
4

POST filed no answer

because no answer was required by law.

Petitioner's

'Verified

Complaint" was a complaint only in the plain, everyday sense of the
word.

It was not a "Complaint" as a legal term of art, but a

complaint as in an expression of dissatisfaction.

It was not a

"Complaint" before a judicial or administrative body.
was

not

a

"Complaint,"

and

did not

trigger

an

Because it
adjudicative

proceeding and the requirements of UAPA, no "Answer" was required
by law.

Therefore, no record has been created for this Court to

review, nor are there uncontroverted facts as a part of any record.
Petitioner has filed four lawsuits, all stemming from the acts
of Officer Gurley in conjunction with his duties as a wildlife
officer in dismantling a bird trap constructed from two by fours
and chicken wire.

Petitioner has filed two now consolidated

actions in state court against Mr. Gurley alleging conversion and
tortious interference with contract, Civil Nos., 90-0300-302 and 910300-249, and two actions in federal court, one against Mr. Gurley,
two attorneys general, Paul Van Dam in his personal capacity, the
Division of Wildlife Resources, the State of Utah and the office of
the Attorney General for an alleged violation of Mr. Nielson's
civil rights, Civil No. 92-C-0485G, and one against a Von Leavitt,
who was riding with Mr. Gurley the day in question, Civil No. 92-C0008B.

The facts as developed to support these

(now) three

lawsuits are not simple, and would be a waste of this Court's time
to

review

in

substance.

However,

a

few

examples

of

the

mischaracterizations Petitioner engages in follow.
Mr. Nielson states that Officer Gurley is an adjudicated
5

perjurer. Petitioner's Brief at 9, 11, 29, 35. No order in any of
the above proceedings exists finding Officer Gurley guilty of
perjury. Mr. Nielson also claims that Officer Gurley "embarked on
a pattern of conduct involving falsification of documents and
perjury

in

an

effort

Petitioner's Brief at 9.

to

conceal

his

wrongful

conduct."

Just as there was no adjudication of

perjury, neither were there findings that Officer Gurley backdated
the report to which Mr. Nielson is referring in his brief. Without
delving further into the facts, these two examples are offered as
evidence of the very controverted nature of the facts as they exist
in the civil cases brought by Mr. Nielson, and the fact that they
should not form the basis for any decision by this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court is being asked to find that any time a citizen
files a complaint concerning an officer's actions POST must hold a
hearing in order to protect the due process rights of the citizen
making the complaint.

Such a concept is incorrect as a matter of

law and unacceptable as a matter of policy.
The Division of POST was created to oversee the training and
discipline of police officers.

The fact that discretion as a

matter of policy is necessary for POST to accomplish its charter is
reflected by the statutes and rules governing POST.

In order for

a citizen to initiate an adjudicative proceeding, a statute or rule
must authorize it. Neither statute nor rule applying to POST does
so. This entire case results from petitioner's misunderstanding in

6

confusing what is authorization to initiate an investigation with
authorization

to

initiate

an

adjudicative

proceeding.

An

investigation is not an adjudicative proceeding. An investigation
may result in an adjudicative proceeding or in a decision not to
refer to an adjudicative proceeding—at

the discretion of the

agency. A citizen complaint cannct require the commencement of an
adjudicative

proceeding,

bypassing

the

agency's

discretion.

Because the agency properly exercised its discretion in determining
to close the case without an adjudicative proceeding, there was no
adjudicative proceeding and therefore no final order.

Given that

there was no final order, there can be no appeal to this Court.

ARGUMENT
I.

A Citizen Complaint
Proceedi na.
A.

Does

Not

Initiate

an

Adjudicative

UAPA governs state agency adjudicative proceedings.

UAPA provides that adjudicative proceedings can be commenced
in two ways:
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20
[referring to emergency procedures], all adjudicative
proceedings shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are
commenced by the agency; or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are
commenced by persons other than the agency.
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-3(l) (1989) (emphasis added).
UAPA also explains that an adjudicative proceeding can only be
commenced by an individual other than an agency by a Request for
Agency Action:
7

Twlhere the law applicable to the agency permits persons
other than the agency to initiate adjudicative
proceedings . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).

Thus,

there must be' a statute or administrative rule permitting a person
such as Mr. Nielson to initiate an adjudicative proceeding by a
Request for Agency Action.
B.

The relevant POST statutes and rules actually preclude
an individual's initiation of an adjudicative proceeding
by a Request for Agency Action.

UAPA itself does not provide a substantive right to an
individual to initiate an adjudicative proceeding.

Only another

law applicable to the agency can permit a person other than the
agency

to

initiate

adjudicative

proceedings.

POST'S

rules

regarding discipline are very explicit concerning who can initiate
an adjudicative proceeding:
Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20
[emergency procedures] and Rule R728-409-25 [emergency
proceedings]r all adjudicative proceedings shall be
commenced by notice of an Administrative Complaint
accompanied by a Notice of Agency Action.
Administrative Rule 728-409-8(A) (1992) (emphasis added). As noted
above, A Notice of Agency Action is a term of art for the mechanism
used when adjudicative proceedings are initiated by the agency.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) (1989). The language of this rule
clearly precludes initiation of an adjudicative proceeding by an
individual's Request for an Agency Action.
C.

A citizen complaint initiates an investigation, not an
adjudicative proceeding.

The Petitioner has confused the process for initiating an
8

investigation
adjudicative

by

POST

with

proceeding.

the

process

Administrative

for
Rule

initiating

an

728-409-5(B)(6)

clearly provides:
The initiation of an investigation may occur upon any of
the following circumstances;
(6) A complaint from a citizen which, on its face,
appears to be a violation of section 409-3 above.
(Emphasis added.)
Only an investigation may be initiated by a complaint from a
citizen.
Petitioner's mistake can be traced to his explanation of the
"five levels" provided by the administrative rules for processing
questions of police officer misconduct.

Petitioner's Brief at 12-

14.
Level

one, as Mr. Nielson

notes, is the allegation of

misconduct, which is governed by R728-403-3 through -5.

These

rules provide that the agency may initiate an investigation upon
receipt of information "from any responsible source" that grounds
for discipline exist.

Sources are listed in R728-409-5, among

which is a citizen complaint.
Level Two is the investigation itself. This level is governed
by R728-409-5 and -6. The rules provide discretion to the agency
concerning when to initiate an investigation, and some discretion
concerning the progress of an investigation. It also provides that
Final disposition of a case (i.e., close case, refer to
department for follow-up action, refer for adjudicative
proceeding, etc.) will be made by the bureau chief with
the approval of the director.
Administrative R728-409-5(M) (emphasis added).
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It is clear that

the decision regarding the final disposition of an investigation,
i.e. whether it should be closed or referred for an adjudicative
proceeding, is to be made by the bureau chief with the approval of
the director, not by a presiding officer as stated by petitioner.
Mr. Nielson claims, citing to no authority, that "[a]ny decision,
including any decision to discontinue action, must be made by the
'presiding officer' or the Council on Peace Officer Standards and
Training . . . . Petitioner's Brief at 12. There is no mention of
a

presiding

officer at this

adjudicative proceeding.

level nor any reference

to an

There is an unambiguous directive that

the bureau chief may, at Level Two—the investigation—close the
case or refer it for a future adjudicative proceeding.
Nielson's references at Level Two to UAPA are premature.
not

triggered

until

an

adjudicative

proceeding

is

Mr.

UAPA is
actually

commenced. An adjudicative proceeding was never held in this case.
POST'S letter to Mr. Nielson indicated that the decision at Level
Two was to close the case—an option clearly granted the director
and bureau chief by R728-409-5(M).
II•

If There is No Adjudicative Proceeding, There is No Final
Order, and if There is No Final Order. This Court has No
Jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals' jurisdiction is governed by Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3. The provision complainant relies on is Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a), which states:
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies . . .
10

Thus, in order for jurisdiction to lie in this case, there must be
a final order resulting from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a
state agency•
jurisdiction•

Short of this, the Court of Appeals simply has no
As detailed

above, there was no adjudicative

proceeding, thus no final order, and therefore this Court does not
have jurisdiction over this matter.
III. Petitioner Has No Due Process Rights in this Matter.
Due process is guaranteed citizens of the United States by the
Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, which

provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."

U.S. Const, amend. XIV.

The Utah Constitution also affords due process rights with the
following similar language: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law," Utah Const, art.
I, § 7.

Thus, due process

is dependent

deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

upon

the possible

Petitioner's life,

liberty or property have never been at risk in this case. Were Mr.
Nielson contesting the loss of his property and attempting to
recover it, or were he attempting to receive damages, he would be
entitled to a hearing because he would have property rights to
protect.

None of those rights were at stake in the agency

proceeding below.

What was at stake in the agency below was

Officer Gurley's right to pursue his career, and thus Officer
Gurley would have a due process right to a hearing if a suspension
of

his

peace

officer

certification

were

being

sought.

A

complainant such as Mr. Nielson simply has no rights at stake in
11

agency

disciplinary

actions

that

afford

him

due

process

protections.

IV.

An Agency Must Have Discretion to Proceed or Dispense With
Disciplinary Proceedings.
It is incredulous that a simple process for affording citizens

a right to voice their concerns about police actions has been so
misconstrued.

The congestion that would be caused if indeed each

and very citizen

complaint were required

to go to a formal

adjudicative proceeding is unimaginable. Frankly, no one would be
willing to become a police officer if faced with having to defend
continually against unscreened complaints.
should have to defend

Officers rightfully

themselves on those occasions

where a

screening has indicated a formal proceeding is appropriate.

But

POST must have the authority and discretion to screen citizen
complaints.

See General Motors v. Federal Energy Regulatory

Comm'n, 613 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (administrative agency's
decision to conduct or not to conduct an investigation is committed
to agency's discretion).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nielson is not entitled to an adjudicative proceeding or
hearing of any kind to litigate his complaint against Officer
Gurley.

That

does not mean, however, that Mr. Nielson

is

foreclosed from having whatever legitimate claims he may have heard
in court. There is a forum in which Mr. Nielson can obtain his due
process guarantees, a forum in which he may pursue any rights that
may have been affected. That forum, however, is a civil suit where
12

Mr. Nielson may properly be a party to a suit.

Mr. Nielson, in

fact, has availed himself—thrice—of such a forum.

There is no

authority, statutory or by rule, nor should there be, that provides
for every citizen who wishes to complain of police action, a right
to an adjudicative proceeding where the decision to decertify or
suspend the officer's POST certification would be at issue.
Given that there was no adjudicative proceeding, the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction to review the discretionary
determination

of POST that there was no cause to refer Mr.

Nielson's complaint against Officer Gurley to an adjudicative
proceeding. This Court's appellate jurisdiction over agency action
is limited to a review of an agency final order—i.e., an order
obtained following a formal adjudicative proceeding.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'

day of December, 1992.

R. Paul Van I uam
Richard D.Uwyss
Betsy L. Ross
Attorneys for Respondents
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